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LAW AND LANGUAGE: THE ROLE OF PRAGMATICS IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONt
MB. W. Sinclair*
In everyday conversation social conventions constrain our speech and aid understanding
of the speech of other& These social conventions have been analyzed by the philosopher H.P.
Grice and others. Professor Sinclair explores the applicability of such conventions to statutes
and thereby derives a set of pragmatic rules of statutory construction. These rules explain
some of the intuitions underlying "canons of construction" and their limitations and provide
a basis for understanding and for criticizing some important judicial decisions.
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I. SPEECH ACT THEORY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Legal theorists have successfully maintained a superb oblivion to the his-
torical and social features of legal language. . . rather than studying the
actual development of legal linguistic practice...**
This Article is an attempt to treat one aspect of "legal linguistic
practice" in its historical and social context. By using some basic and
well-established linguistic theory-speech act theory-it examines the
implications of the social facts of enactment of a statute as communi-
cation. The result is a set of principles which clarify many of the
processes of statutory interpretation with which we all must struggle.
Putting together a part of speech act theory and some commonly ac-
cepted intuitions regarding statutory interpretation produces a fairly
cohesive and easily applicable set of principles. The mystery and un-
certainty of some aspects of statutory law is commensurately reduced.
Legislatures, when they enact statutes, are initiating communica-
tions with the persons subject to their jurisdiction. The enactment of
a statute is communicative behavior; insofar as a legislature can
speak, it is legislative speech, and each provision of a statute enacted
is a legislative utterance. We should therefore be able to gain in in-
sight and understanding by applying speech act theory to statutes.
Of course, even though we might use the locution, ' a legislature
** Goodrich, Law and Language: A Historical and Critical Introduction, 11 J. LAW & Soc.
173, 173 (1984).
1. For example: "The Legislature speaks; its officers act." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2
Otto) 214, 252 (1875). Professor Moore refers to statutes expressly as speech acts. Moore, The
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does not speak in the literal sense. The modem American legislature
has no oral voice2 but is confined to the printed word in its communi-
cative performance. Legislatures speak through their statutes. 3 If leg-
islatures so speak, to what extent should they be held to the
conventions that control the production and interpretation of speech
in everyday social intercourse? Can we apply the same interpretive
rules to Congress that we require to make everyday conversation pos-
sible? Does the difference in kind between oral and written speech
make a critical difference and, if so, what?4
Theoretical linguistics has traditionally been divided into three
parts: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.5 The theory discussed in
this Article is in that part called pragmatics, "the study of linguistic
acts and the contexts in which they are performed."' 6 The theory of
pragmatics offered here is based on the assumption that legislatures
act in a context, for a purpose, and within the requirements imposed
by communication.
In particular, I shall use the seminal work of the English philoso-
pher H. P. Grice on the social constraints on conversation. Originally
the William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1967, the text
was widely circulated in manuscript form and quickly became a
landmark in the literature of pragmatics.7 The strategy of this Article
is to examine the extent to which Grice's "conversational constraints"
apply to legislative speech. Accordingly, Part II is an outline of
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 294 (1981). Professor Kevelson argues that judicial
decisions also should be treated as speech acts. Kevelson, Language and Legal Speech Acts: Deci-
sions in 3 LINGUISTICS AND THE PROFESSIONS: ADVANCES IN DISCOURSE PROCESS 121 (1982).
2. Of course, members of a legislature speak, and their speeches are recorded in legislative
histories. However, a member is not a legislature. Throughout this Article, I shall by "legislative
speech" and various synonyms be referring to legislative enactments, not to the utterances of
members.
3. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 9-11
(1975).
4. I do not wish to intimate any prejudice one way or the other as to the primacy of the oral or
the written form of language. So long as we can understand what we are doing such disputes can
best be left to Messrs. Derrida et aL See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (English trans.
1977).
5. See, e.g., Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
UNIFIED SCIENCE (1938).
6. Stalnaker, Pragmatics, 22 SYNTHESE 272, 275 (1970).
7. It has since been published in edited form. All cites herein are to the version published in 3
P. COLE & J. MORGAN, SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, SPEECH ACTS 41 (1975) under the title Logic
and Conversation. This text is readily available. In the following it will be referred to as Grice.
Although since extended and refined by Grice and others, the solidity of Grice's basic ideas has
never been shaken.
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Grice's theory and a comparison of pragmatic rules with the rules of
syntax and semantics. The points made are essential to the following
legal applications.
Grice's theory is of an idealized, cooperative conversation. Leg-
islative speech (that is statutes) has many similarities to such conver-
sation, but of course there are also many differences. These
similarities and differences will determine the applicability of Grice's
maxims to legislative speech and thus to statutory interpretation.
Part III discusses those similarities and differences in relation to
Grice's theory. Although the particular principles developed by
Grice do not apply directly to legislative speech, most of the insights
underlying them do.
Part IV develops and illustrates modifications of Grice's maxims
so that they may apply to statutes. There should be nothing substan-
tively new at any particular point in this section. My aim is to make
explicit what is already implicit in the juristic process.8 Thus each
point made should not only be intuitively viable but should also be
represented in judicial opinion. The result, if successful, will be a
clarification of the reasons for some common intuitions about the
meaning of statutes, that is, an aid to the understanding of reasoning
processes we already, for the most part, accept.9 Collectively, the
pragmatic principles developed can be seen as an analysis of what it is
for a legislature to act rationally, reasonably, and purposefully.
Although these pragmatic principles are formulated as rules for
how a legislature should proceed in enacting laws, their ultimate value
is as interpretive devices. One of Grice's most important products
was a firmer and more systematic basis for our understanding of the
information conveyed in social conversation. A major goal of this
Article is, similarly, to generate principles of interpretation justifying
the extraction of a fuller range of information from a statute.
Accordingly, Part V illustrates the application of the theory de-
veloped in Part IV. The first section comprises two examples of ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. The second section comprises a
discussion of well-known interpretive devices: I hope to demonstrate
8. "Philosophy begins with the concepts of ordinary, every-day knowledge; and it consists in
an extended, detailed and complete exposition of those concepts .... " Oakeshott, The Concept of
a Philosophical Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 1938 POLITICA 345, 346. See also W. HEGEL, THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF RIGHT 225 (1821).
9. "In law as elsewhere, we can know and yet not understand." Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37 (1954), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983).
[Vol. 46:373
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that at least some of the old and much maligned canons of construc-
tion can be pragmatically justified.
II. PRAGMATICS
A. A Brief Outline of Grice's Theory
Grice's argument is based on the simple, general proposition that
human conversation is, for the most part, a cooperative and purposive
process:
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of discon-
nected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are charac-
teristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set
of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. 10
This could scarcely be disputed. Its importance lies in what follows
from it. For example, "at each stage [of a conversation], some possi-
ble conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally un-
suitable."'" Thus, Grice formulates his most general conversational
maxim, the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: "Make your conversa-
tional contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs,
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged."' 12 More specific maxims follow from this general
principle. Grice collects them in four categories- quantity, quality,
relation, and manner.13
1. The Maxims of Quantity
The category of QUANTITY relates to the quantity of information to be
provided, and under it fall the following maxims:
1. Make your contributions as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contributions more informative than is
required. 14
In brief, a conversational participant should say as much as, but not
more than, he or she can. An example from an ordinary conversa-
tion 15 might be as follows. Suppose A arrives at the office and says to
10. Grice, supra note 7, at 45.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The clearest illustrations given by Grice are of transactional analogs. (As such, they are
1985]
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B: "I just saw a big crash on 3rd and Jordan with three cars in it!" A
few minutes later C arrives and joins the discussion saying: "I just
saw a big crash on 3rd and Jordan with three cars, a truck, and a
motorcycle in it!" B, wondering about the extra truck and motorcy-
cle, then asks A if that was the same crash he had seen, and A replies
that it was but that what he had said was not false because, after all, it
was true that there were three cars in the crash, and he just hadn't
bothered to mention the other vehicles. Was there not something
very strange, indeed infelicitous,' 6 about A's opening statement? A
violated the maxim of quantity. However, in normal conversation or
speech making we often rely on and use conversational conventions
for dramatic effect. For example, one way in which we exploit the
first maxim of quantity is by "utterances of patent tautologies like
. . . War is war."' 7
The second maxim under the category of quantity ("Don't say
too much") is not so easy to explain. Indeed, as Grice notes, violation
of it may not be so much "a transgression of the [Cooperative Princi-
ple] . . . [as] merely a waste of time."' 18 Nevertheless, "hearers may
be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT
in the provision of the excess of information."' 19 Such a misconcep-
tion could be especially pertinent to legislative utterances.20
2. The Maxims of Quality
Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim-"Try to make
your contribution one that is true"-and two more specific maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.2 '
perhaps more accurately illustrative of legislation than of normal conversation.) His illustration of
the maxim of quantity is: "If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be no
more nor less than is required; if, for example, at a particular stage I need four screws, I expect you
to hand me four, rather than two or six." Grice, supra note 7, at 47.
16. "Felicity" has become a term of art; Grice's conversational maxims are sometimes called
"felicity conditions." If a person is complying with all relevant conversational maxims, then that
person is speaking felicitously. The word carries an appropriate connotation of good faith as well as,
in this context, requiring compliance with general social conventions. This use of "felicity" was
originated, I believe, by J. L. Austin in his William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955. See J. L.
AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 14 (2d ed. 1975).
17. Grice, supra note 7, at 52.
18. Id. at 46.
19. Id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
21. Grice, supra note 7, at 46. Grice's transactional illustration is:
I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an ingredient
[Vol. 46:373
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That the maxims of quality apply to ordinary social conversation is
obvious. Many literary and conversational devices depend on the
flouting of the first maxim of quality; for example, irony, metaphor,
meiosis, and hyperbole.22 Both of the maxims of quality involve the
concepts of truth and falsity. As these concepts have little relevance
to statutes,23 the applicability of the maxims of quality to legislative
discourse, in the form in which Grice has stated them, is
problematic.24
3. The Maxim of Relation
There is a single maxim under the category of RELATION: "Be
relevant. ' 25 Grice notes that this is a very difficult maxim to elabo-
rate for ordinary conversation, the focus of which can shift in a vari-
ety of subtle ways.26 At the most obvious level, however, it is clear
that one ought not to change the subject without flagging the fact that
one is doing so. Some conversational moves are also quite blatantly
irrelevant. For example: "If O'Leary asks, 'Are you going to the
party?' it would be inappropriate for you to answer, 'Yes, snow is
white.' "27
4. The Maxims of Manner
The category of MANNER relates "not (like the previous cate-
gories) to what is said but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be
said." 28 Under it Grice includes:
the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous'-and various maxims such as:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt; if I need a
spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.
Id. at 47.
22. Id. at 53.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
25. Grice, supra note 7, at 46. Grice's transactional illustration is:
I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the
transaction; if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good
book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later
stage).
Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 46.
27. The example is Stalnaker's; see Stalnaker, supra note 6, at 278.
28. Grice, supra note 7, at 46 (emphasis in original).
1985]
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4. Be orderly. 29
The maxim of manner is more of an ideal than are the preceding three
maxims. Conversation in violation of it may be tedious, but it would
not fail the Cooperative Principle.
There is a great amount of intuitive plausibility to these maxims;
they describe the conditions under which conversation most usefully
proceeds. Casual empiricism tells us that they do in fact apply but
also that they are frequently violated. That they are violated purpose-
fully, accidentally, or ignorantly does not detract from their empirical
validity. Oral conversation commonly involves ungrammatical
sentences, but we do not for that reason reject descriptive grammar.
Similarly, violations of conversational felicity conditions do not neces-
sarily require their rejection. The point of such counter-examples is
that we see them as violations, not as normal. As such, they tend to
reinforce rather than detract from the validity of the analysis.
Nevertheless, if we are to be able to use these maxims as conver-
sational constraints to generate rules (analytic techniques), we should
require that they be founded in something more solid than mere em-
pirical regularity. As Grice puts it, "I would like to be able to think
of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as some-
thing that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is
reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon. ' 30 Although
he does not claim to have proved that the maxims must hold, Grice
does argue persuasively that it is "reasonable (rational)" 3' that they
should:
[A]nyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/
communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and
being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given
suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be
profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general ac-
cordance with the [Cooperative Principle] and the maxims.32
One could add further that it is very difficult to imagine conversation
continuing in anything like the form in which we know it if these
maxims were generally abandoned.
If one assumes that a speaker is speaking felicitously (i.e., that he
29. Id. The transactional illustration is: "I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution
he is making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch." Id. at 47.
30. Id. at 48 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 49.
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or she is acting in accord with the Cooperative Principle and max-
ims), then one can infer a great deal more than the semantic content
of the words themselves. Such inferred information flows not just
from the words chosen but from the fact that this particular speaker
chose them and used them at this juncture of this discourse. In other
words, such inferences require the utterance to be evaluated in its to-
tal context.
Grice coined the term "implicate" (and "implicature," "impli-
catum") for this kind of inference to distinguish it from "imply" (and
variations thereon).33 The words have gained wide acceptance, usu-
ally in the form "pragmatic implicature" or "conversational implica-
ture." Grice illustrates implicature with the following example:
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now
working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies,
"Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to
prison yet."'34
A might be well aware of what peculiar quality of C prompted the tag,
"he hasn't been to prison yet," but if he is not, he certainly is entitled
to ask of B what he was implicating. At the very least, it is "that C is
potentially dishonest." If C were known by B to be a normally honest
person without a record, then B would have violated at least the
maxim of relevance. Yet his assertion would not for that reason be
false; it would, rather, be infelicitous, a violation of a conversational
constraint. The implicature depends on the assumption of the obser-
vation of the conversational maxims.
This example rests entirely on the words the speaker chose to
use.35 In a similar fashion, the timing or the ordering of a speaker's
utterances can vary their overall force. For example, the two
sentences "Nixon made a speech" and "Nixon cleaned his teeth,"
when uttered consecutively in that order, make a point that would be
missed if the order were reversed or if they were not used
consecutively.
There are many situations in which we depend upon information
about the context of an utterance that is not included in the actual
words used or their arrangement for the full understanding of the ut-
terance. The most obvious examples include the use of indexicals:
33. Grice, supra note 7, at 43-44.
34. Id.
35. Even clearer is "She was poor but she was honest;" the use of "but" makes sense only
against a background implicature of dishonesty among the poor.
1985]
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"This one is green!" Other examples are not quite as obvious. Grice
uses an example 36 of two persons, A and B, planning a holiday in
France, during which A wants to visit C. A says "Where does C live?"
B replies, "Somewhere in the south of France." From this reply, A
can deduce that B does not know exactly where (for example, in what
city) C lives. This is not an adequate answer for planning purposes.
Had B known more, he would have been required, by the first maxim
of quantity, to say so. But had he hazarded a more accurate specifica-
tion of C's whereabouts without evidence to support it, he would have
been violating the maxims of quality. Hence, the conversational im-
plicature: B does not know in what town C lives. To reach this con-
clusion required knowledge not only of the words used but also of the
nature and purpose of the conversation and of the normal require-
ments for locating persons and that "the south of France" does not
satisfy them.37
It is important to distinguish between implicature and assump-
tion. For example, one might assume, for the purposes of argument,
that all persons are to be treated equally in all respects. A claim that
amounted to unequal treatment would then be simply inconsistent
with the assumption and, for that reason, rejected. Such a procedure
does not depend on conversational constraints; 38 the person who as-
serted the claim need not have violated any conversational maxim.
One can get something wrong without being infelicitous, just as one
can be infelicitous without being wrong.
B. Pragmatics, Syntax, and Semantics
Principles of pragmatics, such as Grice's maxims, are not rules
that bind their subjects as do, say, rules of chemistry or mathematics.
They are not invalidated by individual counter-examples, and they
can even conflict with one another.39 Communication, however,
could not survive their general abandonment. In this subpart, I shall
36. Grice, supra note 7, at 51-52.
37. No doubt there is more required, contextual knowledge that is much too obvious for us to
notice. Wittgenstein: "What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the
importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are hardly ever
mentioned because of their great generality." L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
56 (1953).
38. This example is from B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 7 (1980).
Ackerman did not make this distinction.
39. Pragmatic principles are in this respect quite similar to the jurisprudential principles that
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes from rules and policies in that they have "the dimension of weight."
See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26 (1977).
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draw out these qualities of pragmatic principles by comparing and
contrasting them with the rules of syntax and semantics.
There are some very important differences between the conversa-
tional maxims and the rules of syntax and semantics.40 A speaker
who violates the rules of English syntax is, in a sense, not speaking
English. Even more clearly, a speaker who attempts to use English
words with different meanings will fail to communicate with a con-
ventional English-speaking hearer. The rules of English (or of any
other language) syntax and semantics are constitutive of English.4'
The rules of felicitous conversation are, by contrast, regulative rules.
They tell how conversation can get somewhere, achieve its ends; vio-
lating them does not mean one is not speaking the language.42
Whereas the rules of syntax and semantics apply quite pre-
cisely43-an utterance complies or it does not-the conversational
maxims apply "more or less." We can and do violate them, deliber-
ately or otherwise, and it is a matter of judgment how well they are
being observed in any given conversation.
The rules of syntax and semantics are conventional in the very
strong sense 44 that they are arbitrary, depending on no external crite-
ria for their selection. Different meaning assignments to sound or sign
sequences would work as well, provided they were the convention.
Grice's conversational maxims are not conventional in this sense.
They are deductible from extralinguistic phenomena, in particular,
from the social goals of conversation. We wish to use our conven-
tional language to some end and require social conventions, such as
Grice's maxims, to make that possible.
Whereas the rules of syntax and semantics remain much the
same over widely variant kinds of language use,45 the maxims of
pragmatics do not. The social conventions of different kinds of dis-
course can be quite diverse. Consider, for example, the courtroom
40. The first three of the following distinctions and many more are summarized clearly in G.
LEECH, PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS 19-45 (1983).
41. This distinction between constitutive and regulative rules originates, so far as I know, in J.
SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs 33 (1969).
42. Of course, if there were to be a general abandonment of the maxim of quality, it is difficult
to imagine language surviving.
43. For all that, we tolerate large violations in ordinary conversation.
44. See F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 67 (1959).
45. There are, of course, well-known exceptions. Familiar examples from the language of law-
yers are the common omission of articles (syntax) and the use of "language" where other disciplines
use "words" or "passage" (semantics).
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dialogue in a famous case:46
"Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich."
In reality, Bronston had maintained a personal bank account for al-
most five years in Geneva, Switzerland. His response was not false,
but it did violate the maxim of quantity. He was convicted of perjury,
and his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals.47 The
Supreme Court was unanimous in reversing. Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
Beyond question, petitioner's answer to the crucial question was not re-
sponsive if we assume, as we do, that the first question was directed at
personal bank accounts. There is indeed, an implication in the answer to
the second question that there was never a personal bank account; in
casual conversation this interpretation might reasonably be drawn. But
we are not dealing with casual conversation and the statute does not
make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state any material matter
that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true.
It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial interroga-
tion, and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, prying, pressing
form of inquiry. If a witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility to
recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush
out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.48
The Cooperative Principle applied to courtroom cross-examination
does not generate the maxim of quantity.49 Normal syntax and se-
mantics nevertheless are still required.
The theory presented so far is intended primarily to apply to or-
dinary social discourse. Such discourse is normally about some topic
known to the participants and about which they share some general
knowledge. Ideally, conversation adds to and refines that shared
knowledge: the topical ball should be advanced. 50 It would thus be
46. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973).
47. United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
48. 409 U.S. at 357-59.
49. Another clear example is verse. Consider "Little Bo-Peep": "[she] has lost her sheep, and
doesn't know where tofind them;" the italicized portion says no more than is contained in the previ-
ous line. But worse, the poem continues with the dramatic imperative "leave them alone!"; having
lost them AND not knowing where to find them, what else could she do?
50. "We do not, except in social desparation, direct isolated and unconnected pieces of infor-
[Vol. 46:373
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inappropriate to make an utterance which does nothing to further this
goal or which too greatly outstrips the knowledge shared by the other
participants (maxims of quantity). It is also necessary that new asser-
tions in the conversation not be deliberate falsehoods and that the
speaker believe them supportable by adequate evidence; falsehoods
and insupportable statements do not add to or refine the shared
knowledge (maxims of quality). Nor do irrelevancies-utterances
about topics outside the universe of conversational discourse-ad-
vance the topical ball (maxim of relation).
III. LEGISLATIVE SPEECH COMPARED WITH CONVERSATION
This section describes the similarities and differences between
legislative speech and social conversation that are most relevant to the
applicability of Grice's maxims. The most obvious similarity between
conversation and legislation is that they both use language. When one
opens a conversation, one does so assuming that the other partici-
pant(s) understand the language one is using. The language may
change-participants who start in English might also use some
French or Yiddish or change entirely into a different language-but it
ought never to do so in such a way as to preclude the advance of
shared knowledge. Legislatures are usually more restricted in this re-
spect; typically they are required to use only their official lan-
guages(s).:1 Legislatures are also more restricted in this respect
because they have at their disposal only the written form of the lan-
guage in a conventionally restricted form. Gestures, facial expres-
sions, expletives, special emphasis, and even pictorial or diagrammatic
illustrations are typically unavailable.
A second similarity between legislation and conversation is that
both are confined to a particular topic or universe of discourse. In
this respect, too, legislative discourse more closely approaches the ide-
alized conversation than does ordinary social discourse. In the latter,
the topic may be changed in various ways; in any particular piece of
legislation, it may not. The parliamentary device of tacking an un-
popular or controversial bill onto a very popular one reinforces rather
mation at each other, but on the contrary intend in general to give or add information about what is
a matter of standing or current interest or concern." Strawson, Identifying Reference and Truth
Values in PHILOSOPHY, LINGUISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 86, 97 (D. Steinberg & L. Jakobovits eds.
1971).
51. See, eg., In re Lockett, 179 Cal. 581, 178 P. 134 (1919) (statute prohibiting fellatio was
found unconstitutional because "fellatio" is not an English word).
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than refutes this point. The practice is, and is seen by all to be, a
devious and controversial ploy; it is an infelicitous maneuver.
The concept of topic in conversation is not without its difficul-
ties. 52 In legislation, it is somewhat easier to capture. Legislatures
typically address subject areas, later (after enactment) referred to as
the scope of the statute. For example, a state legislature enacting Ar-
ticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code would have as its topic (as
article 2 has as its scope) transactions in goods; 53 thus it would not be
appropriate for it to include a section governing, say, the licensing of
physicians. Whereas the topic of conversation may change at the
whim of the participants, the topic of a piece of legislation may not.
Thus, conversational conventions depending on stability of topic
(maxim of relation) will be more readily applicable to legislative dis-
course than to normal social discourse.
The most obvious difference between legislation and normal con-
versation is that legislative speech is one-sided. The addressees of any
legislative utterance are not present to constrain the conversation;
there is nobody there to say "What an inappropriate thing to say" or
"How does that bear upon the subject at hand?" Of course, the need
for such responses is minimized by preliminary hearings, committee
sessions, and floor debates. But these are preliminary to and not part
of the actual legislative utterance.
It is tempting to say that the actual conversation partners to leg-
islative speech are the courts. 54 Inconcinnities in statutes so often sur-
face and become publicized through the courts. However, very few
legislative utterances are addressed to courts. Any particular legisla-
tion is addressed to the persons who act within its domain of dis-
course. In the most typical examples, these will be persons governed
by the legislature. 55 The courts act as one of the media through which
members of this audience can make their responses known.
A second striking feature of legislative discourse is the general
52. See Reinhart, Pragmatics and Linguistics: An Analysis of Sentence Topics (Indiana Uni-
versity Linguistics Club (1982)) and works included in the excellent bibliography.
53. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1976).
54. As, for example, Calabresi tends to. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES (1982).
55. Nevertheless, legislatures do recognize that the critical part of their audience will be profes-
sionally trained. A clear example is the tax code which, though governing all, is clearly addressed to
(and only intelligible to) specialists. Similarly, when a statute includes a word like "intent" or "neg-
ligent" nobody could doubt that it is the legally developed and not the everyday English meaning
that is intended.
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'irrelevance of truth.5 6 Unlike conversation, it is neither important nor
even relevant to expect of a legislature that its utterances be true.
This is because the underlying purpose of legislative discourse is not
the advancement and refinement of the knowledge shared by the legis-
lature and its audience. Rather, it is the creation of laws within the
bounds of which the addressees are to be required to act.
It is not necessary to resort to the model of law as orders backed
by threats to make this point explicit.5 7 Legislative utterances are not
often affirmative commands or orders.5 8 Yet they do share with com-
mands and orders the feature of being inappropriate subjects for eval-
uation as true or false.
We do, however, require of a legislature that it be consistent, at
least within a given piece of legislation. Consistency is usually ex-
plained in terms of truth: two propositions are inconsistent if they
cannot both be true. Although this does not apply to legislative utter-
ances, 59 it is not difficult to find the correct analogy. Two utterances
within a legislative discourse, that is, two provisions of a statute, will
be inconsistent if complying with one requires violating the other. 60
Thus, as the enactment of a statute proceeds, there will develop a
body of legislative utterances that will ever more closely constrain the
possible subsequent provisions. Such provisions cannot require incon-
sistent actions. This is quite closely analogous to the shared informa-
tion that participants in a conversation have, develop, and refine.
Although legislative enactments are not truth functional, they
are strongly purposive. The role of legislative purpose6 1 is analogous
56. "But the norm enacted by the legal authority. . . cannot be true or false, because it is not
an assertion about a fact-not a description of an object but a prescription." H. KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW 73 (1967) (emphasis in original).
57. See J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1885).
58. This is easily confirmed by checking the grammatical form of legislatively enacted
sentences. (For example, a command always has a deleted second person subject.)
59. Since legal norms, being prescriptions (that is, commands, permissions, authoriza-
tions), can neither be true nor false, the question arises: How can logical principles, espe-
cially the Principle of the Exclusion of Contradiction and the Rules of Inference be applied
to the relation between legal norms, if, according to traditional views these principles are
applicable only to assertions that can be true or false.
H. KELSEN, supra note 56, at 74.
60. Kelsen's answer is: "Two legal norms are contradictory and can therefore not both be
valid at the same time, if the two rules of law that describe them are contradictory; and one legal
norm may be deduced from another if the rules of law that described them can form a logical
syllogism." Id. The distinction between norms and statutes necessary to make sense of this answer
is unnecessary to the present discussion.
61. Kelsen explicitly excludes legislative purpose from the subject matter of the "pure theory"
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to that of truth in conversation in that any utterance, any specific
clause that is contrary or irrelevant to that purpose would be, to that
extent, infelicitous. This point is more controversial because some
have argued that there is nothing determinable that can count as the
purpose of a legislature in enacting a statute.62
What sort of thing is the purpose of a piece of legislation? As
Dickerson 63 points out, there is a whole hierarchy of "ever widening
purposes, beginning at the inner extreme with the specific purpose of
taking that action and ending at the outer extreme with the very gen-
eral purpose of helping to advance the total public good." A similar
hierarchy can be replicated according as one looks to the entire stat-
ute or to ever smaller subparts of it down to the specific clause.
For present purposes I shall use the word "purpose" as applying
only to whole statutes, to whole legislative enactments. These parallel
whole conversations on given topics. For specific sections of a statute,
that is, for specific utterances within the total legislative speech, I
shall use the term "intent." This stipulation corresponds roughly to
that in current usage. Of course, no claim is made that intent and
purpose are distinct or that they are distinct from "meaning." 65
The purpose of the statutory enactment as a whole is still statable
in a variety of ways. Radin uses the example of a gambling statute:
Its immediate purpose is to declare gambling contracts void (or to
create a defense); a broader purpose is to discourage gambling; and
the most general purpose is to promote public welfare. 66 The choice
of law. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE xiii (1945). This in part, I believe,
forced him into his unnecessarily difficult account of inconsistency in legislation.
62. Compare Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869 (1930) and Easter-
brook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-41, 547-49 (1983) (both deny the existence of
a determinable legislative purpose) with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 664 (1958) ("[I]s it really ever possible to interpret a word in a statute
without knowing the aim of the statute?"); see also Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400
(1950).
63. R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 87-89.
64. Id. at 88.
65. There is no suggestion that legislative meaning and legislative purpose can be consid-
ered wholly in isolation from each other. Obviously, the meaning of a statute is the pri-
mary evidence of the purpose underlying its passage, and light may be thrown on the
understood meaning of statutory language if the purpose of the act is clearly
comprehended.
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 741 (1940).
66. Radin, supra note 62, at 876.
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of level of generality is not one of which is correct but, rather, of
which is more useful.
Common sense tells us that the maximal purpose of promoting
public welfare, while surely applicable, is too general to be of any use;
it applies to all statutes, not specifically to the particular one at hand.
This suggests that we should look to the most general purpose that
can properly be found peculiarly applicable to the statute in question.
Following Dickerson, we might call this the immediate purpose of the
statute.67 Narrower refinements might then be thought of as the legis-
lature's intended method of achieving that purpose.
Despite the difficulties that may arise in settling on the appropri-
ate formulation of the purpose of a particular statute, it is clear that
there is always a purpose to be found. "We require our legislatures to
live up to a certain standard of rationality. ' 68 Thus, we would not
accept pointless or spurious statutes or enactments out of "legislative
caprice."' 69
This lengthy digression into the notion of legislative purpose has
been necessary to make the following point. Legislation differs from
conversational speech in that it does not build up and refine factual
information; it is, however, strongly purposive. The legislative pur-
pose serves a function in constraining the utterances of participants
similar to that of truth in the idealized social conversation (maxim of
quality). It will thus play an important role in pragmatic constraints
on legislative speech.
Legislative discourse differs from normal social conversation also
in the confidence we may reasonably place in the good faith and literal
intentions of speakers. In social discourse, all manner of undercur-
rents, misdirections, and deceptions are possible, indeed, common.
We all are aware of this and mentally process the utterances of others
accordingly. With legislative utterances, the converse is true:
[A court interpreting a statute] should assume, unless the contrary un-
mistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable per-
sons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.
It should presume conclusively that these persons, whether or not
entertaining concepts of reasonableness shared by the court, were trying
responsibly and in good faith to discharge their constitutional powers and
67. R. DICKERSON, supra at note 3, at 145.
68. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 225 (1962).
69. Id. at 226. Bickel properly emphasizes the distinction between legislative purpose and mo-
tive. Id. at 210.
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duties. 70
We can put much more faith in the felicity of a legislative utterance
than we can in that of the typical participant in social conversation.
In a similar way, a legislature is limited in its ability to use liter-
ary devices exploiting pragmatic principles; it must wear its discour-
sive heart on its sleeve, so to speak. In conversation, we exploit the
conversational maxims not only by assuming that they hold and by
drawing implicatures, but also by deliberately flouting them, as, for
example, in sarcasm. This latter conversational ploy is not available
to a legislature; ironic or metaphoric legislation would not do. Legis-
lative discourse is forced to be much more pedestrian in its choice of
literary devices. "Because legal documents are for the most part
unemotive, it is presumed that the author's language has been used,
not for its artistic or emotional effect, but for its ability to convey
ideas."' 71 That, however, is as it should be: the communicative func-
tion of legislation is much too important to permit any but the most
straightforward language.
In summary, legislative speech is similar to normal conversation
in that it uses language and is confined by topic or subject matter. It
is strikingly different in that it is one-sided: there is nobody who can
immediately answer back. Although legislative utterances are not
truth functional, as are ordinary conversational utterances, they are
constrained in an analogous way by the purpose of the legislative en-
deavor. How, if at all, do Grice's conversational maxims apply to
these one-sided, written conversations our legislatures have with us?
IV. APPLYING CONVERSATIONAL MAXIMS
TO LEGISLATIVE SPEECH
This section is devoted to adapting Grice's conversational max-
ims to legislative speech and to justifying the adaptation to show them
as rules about how legislatures do talk and about how they always
should talk. The "more or less,"' 72 noncategorical nature of pragmatic
70. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1415 (tent. ed. 1958). Note, however, that
this assumption is not always accepted. For example, Sir Frederick Pollock pointed out that ac-
cepted canons of construction "cannot well be accounted for except on the theory that Parliament
generally changes the law for the worse, and that the business of the judges is to keep the mischief of
its interference within the narrowest possible bounds." F. POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND ETHICS 85 (1882). More recently, a similarly mistrustful attitude toward legislatures seems to
pervade G. CALABRESI, supra note 54.
71. R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 224.
72. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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rules should make us expect exceptions. Accordingly, those excep-
tions should be seen as exceptions, not necessarily as counter-exam-
ples. The general maxims should be supportable as requirements for
the rational continuation of the legislative enterprise.
73
A. The Maxims of Manner
The easiest of the four conversational maxims to apply to legisla-
tion is the fourth, manner: "Be perspicuous."' 74 This is fundamen-
tally different from the other maxims, because it is concerned with
how a conversational contribution is made rather than with what is
said. As such, it and its submaxims apply directly to legislative
speech; of course, a legislature should avoid obscurity and ambigu-
ity-its utterances (statutory provisions) should be orderly and not
unnecessarily prolix.
Compared with normal multilateral conversation, one-sided, leg-
islative discourse requires perspicuity and clarity more intensively. If
it is to communicate with its audience, the legislature will be limited
in its choice of language. As Justice Holmes wrote, "it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed."'75 On the other hand, the audience also has
some burden in this communicative process; it should not be spared
all effort and ought to expect and tolerate the speech mannerisms a
legislature might characteristically develop. Justice Holmes again:
"If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more
limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it
would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to
interpret a statute."' 76 Thus, unless special circumstances show other-
wise, a legislature acting felicitously will use words in the manner that
would be most ordinary to the intended audience. Easterbrook's sug-
gestion that "[w]hen Congress enacts a $10,000 jurisdictional amount,
we cannot be certain whether it means $10,000 in nominal dollars or
real (inflation-adjusted) ones" 77 is simply wrong. We can indeed be
certain.
73. See supra text accompanying note 30.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
75. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (emphasis added). Notice that this
should only hold for statutes that are addressed to "the common world;" statutes addressed to spe-
cialist audiences might appropriately be in specialist language.
76. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
77. Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 536.
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Legislative speech is, as mentioned above,78 also limited by the
medium it must use to reach its audience-the printed word. It is
thus deprived of many of the expressive devices common in social,
oral discourse. Obvious examples are emphasis, pauses, facial expres-
sion, and gestures.
Thus Grice's maxims of manner apply more strictly to legislative
speech than they do to everyday discourse. The differences spring
mostly from the one-sidedness of legislative speech; the hearer
(reader) cannot say "Would you rephrase that, please, I can't under-
stand it as it is.' '79
But with legislative speech we might go even further than merely
applying the usual constraints of manner with special strictness.
Allwood 80 suggests an additional maxim, a "Postulate of Adequacy,"
"Utilize language maximally." This he explains as follows: "Use
words the literal meaning of which gets closest at what you mean.
Not using a certain word which is available is often just as indicative
as to what you mean, as the actual word you have used." 81 We do not
hold this very firmly of ordinary conversation; we usually do not have
time, and many of us simply lack the ability to select the perfect word
or mode of expression to achieve our ends. Legislatures, by compari-
son, do have the resources of critical expertise available in framing
their utterances8 2 and thus reasonably can be held to this standard.8 3
Thus Allwood's Postulate of Adequacy is essential to the possi-
bility of reasonable, legislative communication. If we could not, ab-
sent clear contrary indicia, rely on the legislature to have intended
exactly the choice of words it made, we could have no basis for under-
standing its enactments.8 4
78. See supra text accompanying note 51.
79. The hearer (reader) can however have it repeated as many times as he/she chooses!
80. Allwood, Negation and the Strength of Presuppositions, 2 LOGICAL GRAMMAR REP. 3
(1972).
81. Id. at 4.
82. It is, however, unrealistic to suppose that legislatures always have the time or the inclina-
tion to make adequate use of these resources. Nevertheless, even when a legislature has acted with-
out care or consideration, we have little choice in taking it at its exact word rather than on some
speculation of what it might have said. See infra text accompanying note 84.
83. "But... the usage of Congress simply shows that it has spoken with careful precision,
that its words mark the exact spot at which it stops . Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
84. This justification is a variation on Grice's argument; see supra text accompanying notes 30-
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B. The Maxims of Quantity
The maxims of quantity (say as much as you can, but not more
than required)85 do not, as formulated by Grice, apply directly to leg-
islative speech. The ideal conversation envisioned by Grice involves
increasing and refining the information shared by the participants;
hence Grice's maxims of quantity are appropriate. But legislative
speech does not carry information in the same way; it does not tell us
how things are but tells us how to behave. As the enactment of a
statute progresses what increases is not, as in conversation, the total
shared information, but the total control of behavior being exerted by
the legislature. The restrictions on legislative speech that parallel the
maxims of quantity will thus have to be formulated in terms of behav-
ioral rather than informational limits.
I suggest the appropriate reformulation of the first maxim of
quantity (referred to in the following as "first maxim of quantity (stat-
utes)") to be:
1. Make Each Provision Cover All the Persons and Actions You
Intend It To
Just as Grice's first maxim of quantity is sometimes paraphrased
("say as much as you can") so too can this be paraphrased: "Cover as
much as you intend." Note that we have to substitute "intend" for
"can": we are dealing here not with information exchanges but be-
havioral limitations, and nobody would wish to maximize legislative
control wherever possible. Note, too, that "provision" and "cover all
the persons and actions" have been substituted for Grice's terms
"contribution" and "as informative." Each legislative utterance is a
provision of a statute just as each conversational utterance is a contri-
bution to the conversation, but the latter is an addition of information
whereas the former is not.
Again, the justification is by considering and rejecting the con-
trary rule. Could a legislature bind its subjects to more than is an-
nounced in its statutes or bind more persons than it specifies? Could a
statute banning consumption of liquor by persons under a certain age
be used against a person over that age? If we are to be able to make
sense of statutes and if they are to succeed in guiding behavior, we
85. "1. Make your contributions as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the
exchange). 2. Do not make your contributions more informative than is required." Grice, supra
note 7, at 45. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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must be able to rely on the legislature's compliance with the first
maxim of quantity.
Assuming that a legislature does follow this maxim, we can gen-
erate some fairly stable implicatures. First, following the corollary of
Grice's first maxim of quantity (i.e., "Say something"), we can like-
wise presume that each enacted provision of a statute says something.
Accordingly, if a provision 86 appears merely to repeat a previous pro-
vision, then we should treat that appearance as deceptive and try to
find some additional content in the later one.87 If a later provision
appears to cover the entire domain of a previous provision in a differ-
ent way, that too should be treated as deceptive; the legislature did
not, in its first provision, make an arbitrary and gratuitous utterance,
but said something.88
The application of this implicature can be illustrated with a sim-
ple problem of construing Section 9-506 of the Uniform Commercial
Code:
9-506. Debtor's Right to Redeem Collateral
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral ... the
debtor or any other secured party may unless otherwise agreed in writing
after default redeem the collateral by ....
Does "after default" modify "redeem the collateral" or "otherwise
agreed in writing"? Suppose the former. In the great majority of
cases, 89 the creditor will only have the collateral by repossession after
default. As redeeming by the debtor only makes sense if the creditor
is in possession of the collateral, with rare exceptions, it applies only
after default. Thus on this hypothesis the legislature would have said
little or nothing by adding the modifier "after default." Consider the
alternative hypothesis: "after default" modifies "otherwise agreed in
writing." This would mean that a predefault agreement depriving the
debtor of the right of redemption would be ineffective, a very signifi-
cant and purposeful provision. Thus the choice is easy: The first
86. Or even an additional word or phrase; Justice Holmes referred to "[t]he presumption that
the second word is not added without some meaning." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 63
(1881).
87. Why the later one? The standard presumption, not necessarily based in actual fact, is that
statutes are enacted in linear order from first provision to last. This presumption is supported by the
fact that Congress speaks only through statutes and thus speaks in the linear order of the statute and
by the fact that no other presumption is at all plausible.
88. This is illustrated in Part V with U.C.C. § 2-714(1) & (2) (1983).
89. The exception is the possessory security interest-the pledge; although important, it is now
numerically unusual.
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maxim of quantity (statutes) dictates that in this context "after de-
fault" modifies "otherwise agreed in writing;" 90 the alternative ren-
ders the language virtually meaningless.
A second general pragmatic implicature flows from the first
maxim of quantity (statutes): A statutory provision does not apply to
entities or behavior not in its specific domain and does not place con-
trols on such entities or behavior beyond those specified.91 A clear
illustration occurred in Iselin v. United States.92 Ms. Iselin was con-
testing a tax assessed on her receipts from the rental of her box at the
Metropolitan Opera House. The statute was very detailed in its cov-
erage and apparently was intended to cover all second sales of opera
tickets 93 but, as the government conceded, did not provide "in terms
for taxing a privilege like that enjoyed by the plaintiff."94
The government argued that "Congress clearly intended to tax
all sales of tickets; . . . that this general purpose of Congress should
be given effect, so as to reach any case within the aim of the legisla-
tion; and that the Act should, therefore, be extended by construction
to cover this case." 95 In other words, the government argued that
Congress had violated the first maxim of quantity (statutes) but
should not lose thereby. The Supreme Court held Congress to the
felicity condition: "What the Government asks is not the construc-
tion of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the Court, so
that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included
within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial func-
tion.' '96 Holding the legislature to have followed the first maxim of
quantity (statutes) (that is, to have acted felicitously in legislating
thusly) precludes the interpretation of a statutory provision to cover
more persons or actions than are set forth therein.
90. Nevertheless, the first maxim of quantity should not be expected to hold absolutely for
either all legislative or all conversational speech. Sometimes, especially when substantial discoursive
space has intervened since the previous utterance of it, it may be useful to all to reiterate an impor-
tant point. Even when they are close together repetitions are sometimes to be forgiven rather than
interpreted; for example U.C.C. § 9-306(3) includes "the security interest . . . ceases to be ...
perfected. . . and becomes unperfected." I cannot even pretend to offer a criterion for distinguish-
ing such cases. As with many such conveniences, the propriety of such a reiteration is a matter of
judgment.
91. Were this not the case, persons could be subject to legislative control through a statutory
provision giving them no notice of that fact.
92. 270 U.S. 245 (1926).
93. Id. at 249-51.
94. Id. at 249-50.
95. Id. at 250.
96. Id. at 251.
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When a legislature has said something about a subject, it can be
presumed to have said all that it intended to. In other words, when a
statute is silent, it does not control; silences must be construed as de-
liberate.97 Professor Tribe has provided many splendid examples il-
lustrating this point.98 The present argument shows that Professor
Tribe's thesis can be founded in quite general phenomena.
The second maximum of quantity (say no more than is required)
also requires reformulation to be applicable to legislative speech. I
suggest as its appropriate reformulation (referred to in the following
as "the second maxim of quantity (statutes)"):
2. Make Each Provision Cover Only the Persons and Actions You
Intend It To and No More99
This has a greater similarity to Grice's second maxim of quantity
than did the reformulation of the first maxim of quantity because here
both constraints are social. How much one may be required to say in
conversation is limited by social rather than empirical and evidentiary
facts. So too is the entire legislative process.
The second maxim of quantity (statutes) can be applied to legis-
lative speech strictly and with confidence to generate rules of implica-
ture. A general pragmatic implicature flowing from the second
maxim of quantity (statutes) is that a legislature intends the control
specified to apply to all the behavior (i.e., the persons plus actions)
specified in a statutory provision. Were its intended coverage nar-
rower, it would not have said as much as it did. A dramatic example
of the application of this rule was in the famous case, Caminetti v.
United States.1°° Congress had stated in the Mann Act 1 that it ap-
plied to "any person who shall knowingly transport. . . in interstate
commerce. . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose."'' 0 2 However, Con-
gressman Mann's own committee report stated that the Act was in-
97. "[C]ongress does in truth regulate by its silence as much as by its action." Smith v. Tur-
ner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 122, 290 (1849) (Woodbury, J.) (passenger cases).
98. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds ofCongressional and Consti-
tutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
99. Thus, the first and second maxims of quantity (statutes) could easily be combined into a
single maxim of quantity for statutory enactments: Make each provision cover all and only the
persons and actions you intend it to.
100. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
101. Officially, the White Slave Traffic Act, Act of Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
102. Id. § 2.
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tended to cover commercial vice only and not to reach "immorality in
general."10 3 In other words, the committee said that the statute cov-
ered more than Congress intended, that the legislature had violated
the second maxim of quantity (statutes), but that the intent rather
than the statute should control. The Supreme Court, keeping to the
presumption that Congress always speaks felicitously (in this case, ac-
cording to the second maxim of quantity (statutes)), applied the stat-
ute according to its terms and upheld the conviction of young men
who had traveled, together with willing young women, from Sacra-
mento to Reno for a weekend's diversion. Had Congress not intended
the statute to cover such persons and actions, it should have used
more restricted language.
These two maxims of quantity, as adapted for application to leg-
islative speech, are the most important in practice. The adaptions
(first and second maxims of quantity (statutes)) do not prevent the
application of Grice's more general forms within the natural limita-
tions required. Thus, for example, where Congress intends to prohibit
a certain type of behavior, we can reasonably expect it to specify that
behavior as fully as it possibly can. That is, within these boundaries,
the legislature should still say as much as it can.
C. The Maxims of Quality
Grice's two maxims of quality will also have to be reformulated if
they are to be applicable to legislative speech.104 The main difficulty
with them in Grice's formulation is that they are in terms of truth and
evidence. As has been shown above, the concept of truth is not appli-
cable to legislative enactments. However, the legislative purpose can
fulfill much the same role, and, accordingly, the required reformula-
tions are in terms of furtherance of that purpose.
Grice's first maxim of quality can be applied to legislative speech
in the following reformulation (referred to in the following as "the
first maxim of quality (statutes)"):
1. Do Not Enact a Provision That Can Be Shown Not To
Further the Legislative Purpose
There are difficult choices to be made in reaching this particular
103. H.R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, quoted in dissenting opinion in Caminetti, 242
U.S. at 498.
104. The maxims of quality are: "1. Do not say what you believe to be false; 2. Do not say that
for which you lack adequate evidence." See supra text accompanying note 21.
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reformulation. The first is how to parallel the ordinary speaker's
knowledge of the falsity of his utterance: Should one say "has been
shown" capturing the actual awareness; or should one say "can be
shown," a more useful and powerful form? I chose the latter because
it is fair to assume that a legislature will have adequately researched a
proposed provision to determine whether it furthers the desired ends.
For the practical purpose of statutory interpretation, this seems a fair
assumption regardless of whether such research was in fact done or
the legislative history contains a record of it.
The second difficulty is whether to use the form "not to further"
or the alternative form "detrimental to." The latter is the more accu-
rate parallel to falsity in Grice's formulation. The choice of the for-
mer is essentially political: We believe that everything ought to be
free unless it is essential to some important purpose that it be con-
strained. Thus, the burden should still be on the proponent of a statu-
tory provision to show that it furthers, and not merely that it is not
contrary to, that purpose.105
These same considerations lead naturally to the reformulation of
Grice's second maxim of quality:
2. Do Not Enact a Provision When There Is No Adequate
Evidence That It Furthers the Legislative Purpose0 6
This is a heavily political and controversial recommendation.
Essentially, it recommends that a burden of proof be met before a
further constraint can be placed on the governed. As such, it parallels
Grice's social constraint requiring a participant in a conversation to
be prepared to support an assertion. We are then entitled to presume
that a connection between a statutory provision and the legislative
purpose was established prior to the provision's enactment. This sec-
ond maxim of quality is of little use in aiding us to understand the full
import of a statutory enactment and thus will not be used again in this
discussion.
In dealing with an actual problem of statutory interpretation we
will, as always, assume that the legislature did comply with the
maxim, here the first maxim of quality (statutes). If two interpreta-
105. In a political system in which everything was forbidden except that which was expressly
permitted, the contrary view would hold.
106. Note that this is roughly equivalent to "Do not enact a provision that cannot be shown to
further the legislative purpose" which is very close in words but critically different in meaning from
the first maxim of quality (statutes).
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tions of a provision seem plausible in the abstract, the one that fur-
thers the legislative purpose is the correct choice. A fine example of
this occurs in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Lehigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Yensavage.10 7
Yensavage had been injured while working in Lehigh Valley
Coal Company's mine. A state statute provided compensation to em-
ployees injured in unsafe workplaces, but Yensavage was working
under a contract carefully designed by Lehigh Valley Coal Company
to make mine workers independent contractors. The question thus
was as to the meaning of the word "employee" in the statute. The
company argument, although having conservative authority behind it,
would have required a result contrary to the purpose of the statute.
Accordingly Judge Hand argued:
[The company argument] misses the whole purpose of such statutes,
which are meant to protect those at an economic disadvantage.
It is true that the statute uses the word "employed," but it must be un-
derstood with reference to the purpose of the act, and where all the con-
ditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given
Such statutes ... should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but
with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.'08
In terms of the first maxim of quality (statutes), to interpret the stat-
ute according to the coal company's argument would be to attribute
to the legislature the enacting of a statute lending itself to the opposite
of the intended purpose.
D. The Maxim of Relevance
Grice's single cryptic maxim of relevance, "Be relevant," can be
applied equally to legislative speech. The question we must answer
though is, "relevant to what?" In (idealized) normal conversation,
there is a topic of the conversation and individual subtopics of each
utterance. We tend to understand intuitively what these are when we
are participants, but formulating a rule for picking them in a given
text has proved very difficult. 10 9 With legislative speech the problem
is less difficult. Legislatures cannot change their subjects at whim,
and, in their actual speech (statutory enactments), they are following
107. 218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1914). See also Cox, Judge Learned
Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARv. L. Rv. 370, 377 (1947).
108. Id. at 552-53.
109. See Reinhart, supra note 52.
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a predetermined public plan. Thus, the maxim of relevance is applied
more intensively to legislative than to conversational discourse.
There are two senses in which the topic of a legislative conversa-
tion--of a statute, an act-must be explicated. First, there is the
scope of the statute, its domain of discourse. A statute regulating the
sale of goods (say, Article 2 of the U.C.C.) is, in this sense, on the
topic of goods and sales. It would11° be inappropriate to include in it
a provision regulating the licensing of physicians. The maxim of rele-
vance (henceforth "the maxim of relevance (statutes)") requires that
each provision be about things within the scope of the statute.
Legislative speech also can be said to have a topic in the sense of
a goal or objective. What is the legislature trying to achieve? With
the idealized conversation we assume that the goal is the increase and
refinement of the knowledge shared by the participants. With legisla-
tion we must substitute legislative purpose. Thus, a specific provision
of a statute could violate the maxim of relevance (statutes) in a second
way by being irrelevant to the furtherance or detriment of the legisla-
tive purpose. In this, it is distinct from the first maxim of quality
(statutes) which treats of provisions that may enhance, inhibit, or be
neutral to the furtherance of the legislative purpose, but only if they
have some relevance to it. The maxim of relevance (statutes) treats of
the question whether the provision is assessable on that scale at all.
The maxim of relevance (statutes) primarily refers to the relation
between the intent of a particular provision and the purpose of the
whole statute of which it is a part. Within any particular provision
the same requirement holds between the meaning assigned to any con-
stituent words or phrases and the intent of the whole provision. Par-
ticular words must be construed in accordance with the legislative
intent; to do otherwise would be to hold the legislature guilty of vio-
lating the maxim of relevance (statutes).
The assumption that this maxim is met by legislatures is not only
eminently reasonable but empirically seems always to hold. An exam-
ple is Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage discussed above.' 1 ' The company position followed the
legal dictionary definition of "employee" as contrasted with "in-
dependent contractor." But that distinction had its roots in the law of
agency and liability in tort to injured third parties (respondeat supe-
rior); it was utterly irrelevant to the use being made of "employee" in
110. These are the same examples used above; see supra text accompanying note 53.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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fhe statute in question. Thus, the company argument required a legis-
lative violation of the maxim of relevance (statutes). Judge Hand pre-
sumed the contrary, namely, felicitous legislative speech in accord
with the maxim of relevance (statutes).
All the pragmatic maxims for statutes are justified in the same
way. It is reasonable that a legislature should act in accordance with
them; they are among the characteristics of rationality in legislation.
From the point of view of the "hearer"-the reader of a statute-the
propriety of the maxims is a precondition to the possibility of sensibly
understanding, making use of, and guiding behavior by legislative
speech. Being pragmatic constraints, they in fact may be violated on
occasion, but the entire enterprise of legislation would fail if they were
to be generally disregarded.1 12
In summary, then, Grice's maxims of conversation do apply to
legislative speech. However, legislative speech is different in impor-
tant ways from normal conversation, and, accordingly, the maxims
require reformulation. The reformulated versions have a great
amount of intuitive plausibility and seem empirically valid. Perhaps
more importantly, it is reasonable to hold legislatures to them.
V. EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF GRICE'S THEORY
This section illustrates the use of Grice's maxims, as modified for
legislative speech. The form of the argument is straightforward. The
assumption is that the pragmatic maxims (statutes) developed in Part
IV have been followed and used within the context of enactment to
discriminate between otherwise possible interpretations of a statute.
Requirements generated by pragmatic implicature also limit the range
of possible constructions.
A. Applications in Statutory Construction
1. An Example From the Uniform Commercial Code
Consider the general question whether every breach of contract
for the sale of goods is a breach of warranty under Article 2 of the
U.C.C. In particular, is late delivery a breach of warranty? Our
precode and extra-legal intuitions tell us it is not; but the U.C.C. has
substantially expanded the scope of the primitive concept of warranty
112. The reader will have noticed my determined resistance to saying pragmatic maxims are
"normative" or "empirical."
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in its definitions.' 13
The force of the suggestion that late delivery is a breach of war-
ranty for article 2 purposes comes from section 2-313(l)(a):
2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affir-
mation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
Assuming it is part of the basis of the bargain, is not a firm delivery
date a "promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods"? One is tempted to reply that such a promise does not relate
to the goods but to delivery, nor is it something to which the goods
can conform. But the buyer's reply, "I contracted for these goods at
this place and time," especially if delivery time was in fact a critical
term, keeps the question open. We would appear to be forced to look
to the intent of the legislature and to what ought to be the correct
solution, both notoriously judgmental methods in such confined
spaces. There should be a better way.
The question is not merely academic: it gets its practical teeth
from the damages available. Suppose the jurisdiction to be Texas, the
plaintiff-buyer to be a medium-sized corporation, the goods to be a
highly technical piece of equipment under development at the time of
contracting, and the defendant seller to have failed by six months to
meet the delivery date. The damages under the U.C.C. are, let us say,
substantial but not life threatening to either buyer or seller.
But this is Texas, and we must address the Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)."14 Plaintiff is a con-
sumer for its purposes and thus within the ambit of its very laudable
purpose "to protect consumers against false, misleading, and decep-
tive practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protec-
tion." 15 The link between this statute and the U.C.C.116 is provided
in section 17.43 of the DTPA:
An act or practice that is a violation of law other than this subchapter
may be made the basis of an action under this subchapter if the act or
113. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-315. An example of this expansion is that a core description is now
an express warranty under § 2-313(l)(b).
114. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1973).
115. Id. § 17.44.
116. Texas enacted the U.C.C. in 1965 as TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE (Vernon 1978).
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practice is proscribed by a provision of this subchapter or is declared by
such other law to be actionable under this subchapter.
Breach of warranty (but not other breach of contract) is not only
mentioned in the statement of purpose,117 but also in the provision for
"relief for consumers," section 17.50:
(a) A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following con-
stitute a producing cause of actual damages:
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
The key to the importance of this link between the U.C.C. and
the Texas DPTA is the latter's damage provision:' 1 8
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may
obtain:
(1) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition
the court shall award two times that portion of actual damages that does
not exceed $1,000. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the de-
fendant was committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more
than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000;
(d) Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court costs and rea-
sonable and necessary attorneys' fees.
If late delivery is a breach of warranty, our defendant supplier will
face liability not only for plaintiff's actual damages but for at least
$2,000 plus plaintiff's costs and attorney fees and (because it knew it
was late) the possibility of treble damages." 9 Whether late delivery is
a breach of warranty is thus a critical question; an affirmative answer
could indeed be life threatening to defendant.
Article 2 of the U.C.C., together with the theory developed in the
first part of this Article, provides a very clear answer to this question.
The source of the answer is not in the definitions of warranties but
again in the relevant damages provision of article 2-section 2-714:
2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification. . . he
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss result-
ing in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as deter-
mined in any manner which is reasonable.
117. Id. § 17.44.
118. Id. § 17.50(b).
119. It works in straight breach of warranty cases; see, e.g., Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc.
v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Ralston Oil & Gas Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 706
F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1983).
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(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
Suppose all breaches of contracts for the sale of goods were
breaches of warranty. Then, section 2-714(2) would provide the basic
remedy formula and its own exception tag. What then would section
2-714(1) tell us? Nothing? But that would be a clear violation of
Grice's first maxim of quantity and first maxim of quantity (statutes).
We are justified in assuming that legislatures, when they speak, intend
to say something. Accordingly, section 2-714(1) must apply to some-
thing; there must be some breach of contract under article 2 that is
not a breach of warranty.
The same implicature can be reached by focusing on the lan-
guage used in section 2-714(1). With respect to remedies provisions
throughout the U.C.C., there is a special statement of the legislative
purpose of section 1-106(1):
1-106. Remedies to be Liberally Administered
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed ....
Where the breach is of warranty, the legislature, saying as much as it
can in accordance with the maxims of quantity, provided a formula
for computing damages in accordance with this purpose. 120 In section
2-714(1), still saying as much as it can, it could not provide a formula
similarly furthering the given purpose for cases of breach in general.
Why not? Whatever the actual reason, it must pertain to breaches by
sellers other than of warranty, for otherwise section 2-714(1) would
have been enacted in violation of first maxim of quality (statutes).
Thus again, there must be some breaches by sellers which are not
breaches of warranty. What are they?
The language of section 2-714(1) achieves its general coverage by
using the phrase "non-conformity of tender." In article 2, "tender"
refers not only to the manner and time of delivery of the goods but
also to conformity of the goods themselves:
(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming
goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification neces-
sary to enable him to take delivery. 121
120. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
121. Note that this generates an infelicity in U.C.C. § 2-601, Buyer's Rights on Improper De-
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Thus, in accord with Allwood's Postulate of Adequacy and the max-
ims of manner, section 2-714(1) is designed to cover all breaches by a
seller where a buyer has kept the goods, be they breaches of warranty
or of time and manner of delivery. Breaches of warranty are then
covered particularly in section 2-714(2); breaches of delivery require-
ments remain the exclusive province of section 2-714(1).
In this way the language of the U.C.C., in the light of the maxims
of quantity, quality, and manner, requires the conclusion that a
seller's breach by late delivery not be a breach of warranty. Treble
damages and attorney fees under the DTPA will not be available to
our hypothetical Texas plaintiff.
Of course, one could reach this conclusion on other grounds.
For example, one could look to the policy of the Texas legislature in
enacting the DTPA and the kind of problems it intended to cover.
One could argue on the basis of common sense and reasonableness
that this is the only sensible conclusion. But the point to note for
present purposes is that all these arguments require some judgment to
be made at some point. At least one move is discretionary and, to
that extent, unpredictable and uncertain. The argument based on
conversational constraints does not require judgment or discretion. It
rests firmly in the requirements of rational and reasonable communi-
cative behavior and the minimal presumption that the legislature was,
in enacting the U.C.C., behaving felicitously.
2. Two Cases From the Washington Supreme Court
In 1974, in Helling v. Carey,'22 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton decided that an opthalmologist had, as a matter of law,123 been
negligent notwithstanding the fact that he had followed the proce-
dures and standards accepted in his profession. 24 According to the
court, "reasonable prudence required the timely giving of the pressure
test . . . irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the
opthalmology profession."'' 25 Not surprisingly, this caused some con-
sternation in the medical profession-so much in fact that in 1975 the
livery, which includes the language "if the goods or any tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract." As tender of delivery includes the requirement of conformity of the goods
to the contract the first disjunt--'the goods"-is apparently redundant; that is, the legislature has
used some words but said nothing, violating the maxims of quantity.
122. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
123. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
124. Id. at 516-18, 519 P.2d at 982-83.
125. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
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Washington legislature passed a statute designed to reverse the law
created by the decision. The report of the house committee stated so
directly: "The bill as introduced would reestablish the pre-Helling
standards of negligence that have been developed through case law in
Washington." 126 The statute passed, RCW 4.24.290, provides, in rel-
evant part:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against
* . .a member of the healing arts the plaintiff in order to prevail shall be
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
or defendants failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning
possessed by other persons in the same profession ....
In 1979, the same court again faced the question of reasonable
prudence in medical practice in Gates v. Jensen.127 Defendants again
were opthalmologists who had followed procedures accepted as stan-
dard in the profession. 128 Among other defenses, the opthalmologists
argued that "the Helling rule . .. was abrogated by RCW
4.24.290."129 The court did not agree.
The statute as passed was an amended version of that originally
introduced which had referred to the "skill and care practiced by
others in the same profession."1 30 As enacted, it referred to the "skill,
care and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession."
While noting that the original version "would have established the
standard of care as that skill and care practiced by others in the same
profession,"1 31 the majority read the enacted version as setting a
"much broader" standard allowing "ample scope for the application
of the limited Helling rule." 132 Thus:
The statute as passed requires physicians to exercise the skill, care and
learning possessed by others in the same profession . . . . It is not ar-
gued that respondent and other opthalmologists did not possess the skill,
care and learning required to choose and administer the two alternative,
simple and risk-free tests. 133
126. REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY OF WASHINGTON, 44th Leg., 1st Ex.
Sess., 1975, quoted in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 256, 595 P.2d 919, 925 (1979).
127. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
128. The disease was even the same-glaucoma; the medical procedures in question and other
factual aspects were, however, different.
129. 92 Wash. 2d at 252, 595 P.2d at 923.
130. Id. at 256, 595 P.2d at 926 (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 253-4, 595 P.2d at 924.
132. Id. at 254, 595 P.2d at 924.
133. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Semantically, this majority argument seems unimpeachable:
there is a great deal of difference between skill possessed and skill exer-
cised. The dissenting opinion 134 challenged the majority on these
grounds:
I do not believe that the change of the word "practiced" to "possessed"
frustrated the legislature's purpose in enacting RCW 4.24-290. The issue
is not whether members of the profession possessed, practiced, followed
or exercised a certain degree of skill. Rather, it is whether the standard
of the profession should be used to measure the defendant's conduct in-
stead of the Helling standard of "reasonably prudent under the
circumstances." 135
Maybe so, but that question has already been answered by the court
in Helling and need not be readdressed unless the legislature had since
changed it. The majority's argument is that, on the meaning of the
words of RCW 4.24.290, there had been no change. Why then are so
many uncomfortable with the majority's argument and decision?
The qualms stem from reactions not only to the semantic content
of the legislature's utterance but also the pragmatic content. RCW
4.24.290 was a purposive legislative speech act to be taken as such in
its full context. The majority of Gates v. Jensen ignored this entirely,
focusing only on the string of words as purely a semantic
phenomenon. 136
The majority opinion requires the legislature to have violated
both the maxim of quantity and the maxim of quality (statutes). If
the rule of Helling is still the law in Washington, then the legislature,
despite is deliberate effort to do so, has said nothing. The utterance it
has produced (RCW 4.24.290) also demonstrably does not further the
avowed purpose of the legislature.137 Thus, the majority requires the
legislature to have acted utterly infelicitously in respect to both quan-
tity and quality.
If we assume that the legislature complied with the maxims of
quantity and quality, the majority argument in Gates v. Jensen cannot
be accepted. However, the dissenting position of ignoring the differ-
ence between "possessed by" and "practiced by" is not obviously cor-
134. The decision was en banc (7-2). Six justices joined Horowitz, J. in his majority opinion;
only one joined Dolliver, J. in dissent.
135. 92 Wash. 2d at 257, 595 P.2d at 926 (citations omitted).
136. Such myopia might be justified on the belief that legislatures always and only make mis-
chief. See supra note 70. But this belief is scarcely a plausible basis for modem statutory
interpretation.
137. See supra text accompanying note 126. The purpose was to change the rule of Helling.
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rect either. Under the maxim of manner, and in particular Allwood's
Postulate of Adequacy, we are entitled to presume that the legislature
meant what it said. This is especially pointed here when there was a
change in text during preparation for the legislative act. Simply to
interpret "possessed by" as "practiced by" is also to charge the legis-
lature with infelicity under the maxim of manner.
Clearly, the legislature did not do as well as it ought to have done
in formulating the statute. Which is the worse set of infelicities for
decision purposes? Unless the judiciary is determinedly hostile to the
legislature, 138 the answer is fairly clear. It can be presented more dra-
matically by a simple argument of the kind at which lawyers are most
adept. On the majority view, RCW 4.24.290 requires a medical prac-
titioner always to exercise all the skills possessed by other practition-
ers. Failure "to exercise that degree of skill . . . possessed by other
persons in the same profession"'139 is imprudent, negligent medical
practice. On the facts of Helling and Gates, a prudent opthalmologist
must give every patient a pressure test for glaucoma on every visit.
But this is not only nonsense, it requires an even greater violation of
the maxim of quality, being precisely the contrary of the legislative
purpose. The answer is clear: Minimizing infelicities requires the
court to follow the legislative purpose. Accordingly, the decision of
the Washington Supreme Court in Gates is pragmatically
unacceptable.
B. Applications to Canons of Construction
The second set of examples of the use of pragmatic maxims is
more theoretical. Many famous canons of construction, while having
intuitive plausibility, suffer not only from being applicable only to
limited classes of cases, but also from the fact that there are no rules
for discriminating those classes. This malady is not peculiar to ca-
nons of construction. The trouble with many good arguments is that
they work only when they work. We then have to show how to deter-
mine when that is and why the question at hand is one of those cases.
Typically, however, we skip these last steps.
Consider, for example, generalization arguments. Should A do
X? What would happen if everyone did that? The form is very com-
mon: It is the basis of "rule" as opposed to "act" utilitarianism; it is
138. See supra notes 70 & 136.
139. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1974).
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lurking in Kant's categorical imperative; 140 it pervades judicial opin-
ions.141 The most common illustration substitutes "vote" for "X" in
the above schema: Should A vote? It is raining, and A has work to
do, and A's vote would be insignificant anyway. But generalize, and
the obligation to vote becomes apparent: it would be terrible if no-
body voted. But suppose the question is whether A's wife and A
should go to the movie "Diva" this evening. What would happen if
everyone did that? Catastrophe! Pursuing the argument form can
lead to universal inaction, unless we rephrase the question. What
would happen if every couple in town who is presently debating
whether to go to "Diva" this evening were to decide affirmatively?
Not much; at worst the theater might host an overflow crowd. The
key is what one chooses to generalize over. But how does one make
that choice, if not by the outcome it produces?
This is the besetting problem of the various rules and canons of
construction, too. Karl Llewellyn' 42 produced a list of twenty-eight
rules each matched with its counter, with solid sources for all. He
wrote: "[I]n the field of statutory construction also, there are 'cor-
rect,' unchallengeable rules of 'how to read' which lead in happily
variant directions."'' 43 Seldom, however, does one see a justification
for the application of the rule or canon (rather than its contrary) in
the particular situation at issue. Yet, that is exactly what is required
if the use of such a rule is to count as argument. Again Llewellyn
puts it aptly: "Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular
instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by
means other than the use of canon. ... 44
The theory developed in this Article can help in determining
whether a rule or canon is appropriately applicable in a given case. Of
course, one ought not to expect an automatic answer to the question
of applicability in all cases; courts unavoidably have to make some
140. Any form of the categorical imperative will do; for example: "Act only on that maxim
which will enable you at the same time to will that it be a universal law." I. KANT, THE FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS 38 (1938).
141. For example, regarding police searches of trash cans, the California Supreme Court said:
"We should hesitate to encourage a practice whereby our citizens' trash cans could be made the
subject of police inspection without the protection of applying for and securing a search warrant."
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 367, 486 P.2d 1262, 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68 (1971). The word
"practice" is the key to the generalization here.
142. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rlv. 395, 401 (1950).
143. Id. at 399.
144. Id. at 401.
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decisions. But the level of justification can be pushed back one step
further, and the point upon which the court must actually decide
more clearly demarcated by the use of Grice's maxims. More impor-
tantly, in those cases in which this theory of pragmatics can deter-
mine the applicability of a rule or canon of construction, the
determination will be on grounds independent of the choice of out-
come. It is thus more likely to produce a result in accord with the
legislature's design than with the predilections of the judge, should
those two not coincide.
In the following, I shall discuss two canons of construction-
ejusdem generis (with its colleague, noscitur a sociis) and expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
1. Ejusdem Generis
"Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow
an enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as apply-
ing only to other items akin to those specifically enumerated."1 45
When in a statute the legislature gives a list of examples beginning
with "such as" or ending with "and the like," items not on the list
itself are within the scope of the provision only if they have an appro-
priate similarity to items that are on the list. The rule, like all ca-
nons, 46 is "no more than an aid to construction and comes into play
only where there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular
clause." 147
The problem with this nice-sounding rule is that it always begs
the question. What is it for "other items" to be "akin to those specifi-
cally enumerated?" What are the determinants of kinship? For any
list of words, there are indefinitely many ways in which to describe
what they have in common; there are indefinitely many kinship rules
that will capture some shared property of the items on the list. 148 For
example, consider the "fair use" provision of the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976, in pertinent part:
145. Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980). See also United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 581 (1980).
146. You don't need interpretive aids when the answer is plain on the face of the statute.
147. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. at 588.
148. "Philosophers of science often claim that for any given body of data there are an infinite
number of possible explanations; for the explanatory relation E and any body of data d, an infinite
number of alternative potential explanations stand in the relation E to d." R. NozICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 278 (1974). See also L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§§ 28-30 (1933).
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Sec. 107. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use
[T]he fair use of a copyright work,. . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. 149
The use in question ("second use") is, at this stage of the argument, a
proven or admitted copy of the original copyrighted work. Given
that the second use is not of a kind listed, what must its purpose be
like in order to satisfy this statutory requirement? Could it be that the
listed purposes usually have the original work as their subject; or that
they are usually not as long as the original and thus reach the audi-
ence more quickly; or that these purposes are usually different from
that of the first work? If the list alone is to generate its own kinship
determinants under the rule of ejusdem generis, all we really have is a
challenge to the imaginations of opposing counsel. It thus appears,
prima facie, that the rule is useful only to bolster a conclusion reached
on independent grounds.
There is something wrong with the argument so far. We seem to
be seeking a rule, expressed in an English sentence, to substitute for
the list of examples provided by the legislature. But surely if such a
rule were available the legislature, acting felicitously in accord with
the maxims of manner (including Allwood's Postulate of Adequacy)
and quantity, would have used that instead of the list of examples.150
Saying as much as it could 51 as clearly and concisely as it could, 152
the legislature could not find a rule. Accordingly it resorted to the
next best form, "w, x, y, . . ., and such like." To assume there is a
rule, nevertheless, is to assume infelicitous legislation.
This merely shifts the problem without changing it. Now the
question becomes not "what is the kinship rule?" but "is this particu-
lar thing before the court like those listed in the statute?" This merely
raises the question of the appropriate criterion of similarity, and the
argument begins again. Some progress has been made, however. It
must be clear that the criterion of similarity is determined by what the
149. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1983). The interpretation of this provision played an important part in
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984) (The "Betamax" case). In
particular, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
150. It could, of course, be that the legislature tried but failed to find the rule which some later
work revealed. Such a rare event should prompt an amendment.
151. First maxim of quantity (statutes), supra text accompanying note 85, and Grice's first
maxim of quantity, supra text accompanying note 14.
152. Grice's maxims of manner, supra text accompanying note 29; Allwood's Postulate of Ad-
equacy, supra text accompanying note 80.
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legislature was trying to do in the provision in which it included the
list. What the purpose of the whole statute and the legislative intent
for the provision in question are will determine whether the item in
question in the circumstance in question is akin to the listed items.
Inescapably we are drawn into the first maxim of quality (statutes):
only if it can be shown to further the legislative purpose (as the legis-
lature found the listed examples to do), should the candidate be
granted kinship.
Karl Llewellyn, in his description of the rule opposing ejusdem
generis, makes much the same point: "General words must operate
on something. Further, ejusdem generis is only an aid in getting the
meaning and does not warrant confining the operations of a statute
within narrower limits than were intended."' 153 One of the authorities
Llewellyn cites for this counter, Texas v. United States,154 makes the
point even more directly: "The rule of 'ejusdem generis' is applied as
an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, not to subvert it
when ascertained. The scope of the immunity must be measured by
the purpose which Congress had in view and had constitutional power
to accomplish." 155 The first maxim of quality (statutes) thus
prescribes the method of application of the rule of ejusdem generis:
Only if the item in question can be shown to further the legislative
purpose in the same way as do the items listed should it be held to
come under the statutory provision.
Applying this argument to the fair-use provision of the Copy-
right Revision Act of 1976 clarifies the problem used in the illustra-
tion above. The purpose Congress must further is given in the
Constitution: Promoting the progress of science and useful arts. 156
Congress also had a more precise objective in this particular statute:
"to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow or enlarge it in any way." 157 The doctrine had developed in a
common law fashion that had proved notoriously difficult of defini-
tion.158 Accordingly, Congress enacted a list of categories of second
153. Llewellyn, supra note 142, at 405.
154. 292 U.S. 522 (1934).
155. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
156. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8.
157. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975), H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1976).
158. "Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible. ... H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976).
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uses in which fair uses had previously been found. All the uses on the
list are such as we would expect to serve the constitutional purpose
and in a manner different from that of the work copied. Any item not
on the list 159 at least would have to do likewise to satisfy the ejusdem
generis kinship condition of this statute. 60
Noscitur a sociis, first cousin to ejusdem generis, is the principle
according to which one interprets a word by looking at the meanings
of words adjacent to and associated with it. It thus comes into play,
not as with ejusdem generis, when the court is looking at an item not
in a statutory list, but when it is looking at a word occurring in such a
list but uncertain of meaning. It suffers from similar problems. The
cure is to look to the context of the utterance (enactment) and, in
particular, the purpose as prescribed by the felicity conditions. The
argument was illustrated beautifully in a recent opinion by Lord
Diplock in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Viva Gas Appliances
Ltd. 161
At issue was the meaning of the word "alteration" in a statute
providing an exemption from tax (a "zero-rating") for "[t]he supply,
in the course of the construction, alteration or demolition of any
building. . . of any services." 162 Viva Gas claimed the exemption for
the installation of gas fires in place of coal ones. The local tribunal
and the high court agreed; the court of appeals reversed, denying the
exemption, 163 stating, inter alia:
The conjunction of the words "construction" of a building, "demolition"
of a building and "alteration" of a building indicates that the kind of
alteration must not only be structural but not unlike construction or
demolition and therefore should be substantial .... It must be suffi-
ciently substantial in relation to the relevant building as a whole that it
can properly be described as "alteration of the building."'164
159. For example, parody or burlesque. These were included in an expansion of the section
107 list in the reports of both House and Senate committees; See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 61-62 (1975).
160. This would not mean that it was ipso facto a noninfringing fair use. The Constitution also
prescribes the method Congress must use to promote the copyright purpose: "by securing for lim-
ited times to authors. . . the exclusive right to their. . . writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section
107 of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), continues with
a list of examples of ways in which a candidate fair use might too greatly impinge on this monopoly.
161. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1445. Remember that English judges are not permitted the aid of legisla-
tive history in determining legislative purpose.
162. Finance Act, 1972, sch. 41, § 12, sched. 4, group 8, item 2; see Viva Gas, W.L.R. at 1447.
163. Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Viva Gas Appliances Ltd. [1983] Simm's T.C. 388,
392, quoted in Viva Gas, 1 W.L.R. at 1450 at 115.
164. Id.
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The House of Lords reversed again agreeing with Viva Gas. After
distinguishing cases interpreting similar language from another stat-
ute165 which was "passed for a wholly different purpose," 166 Lord
Diplock elegantly disposed of the above-quoted argument:
My Lords, I cannot with great respect follow the logic of the reasoning
contained in the passages from the Court of Appeal's judgment that I
have cited. The maxim nosciture a sociis may be a useful aid to statutory
interpretation, but the contexts in which it is applicable are limited. In
the case of a word which is capable of bearing various shades of meaning,
the fact that it is included in a list of words of greater precision in which
some common characteristic can be discerned may enable one to say that
the chameleon takes its colour from those other words and of its possible
meanings bears that which shares the characteristic that is common to
the other. But here the socii relied on by the Court of Appeal, "construc-
tion" and "demolition," have no common colour for "alteration," which
is sandwiched between them, to take. "Demolition" far from sharing a
common characteristic with "construction" is its antithesis. Once what
constitutes the relevant "building" has been identified, "Construction,"
., in the absence of any reference to "part of a building," means erect-
ing the building as a whole and "demolition" means destroying it as a
whole, so "alteration" is left to cover all works to the fabric of the build-
ing which fall short of complete erection or complete demolition. 167
Thus the obvious purpose of the legislature was saved. Acting felici-
tously, saying as much as it could (first and second maxims of quan-
tity (statutes)) and with maximal use of language (Allwood's
Postulate of Adequacy) the legislature seems inescapably to be aiming
at all improvements to a building that are not de minimis. 168
2. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
What is espressio unius est exclusio alterius? As Dickerson 169 ac-
curately states, it "is a rather elaborate, mysterious sounding and
anachronistic way of describing the negative implication." Roughly,
to state one thing is to exclude the other. It is one of the most useful
but difficult of all canons of construction. Dickerson again:170 "Per-
haps the most difficult problem in the interpretation of statutes is that
of determining whether a negative implication exists and, if so, how
far it extends."
165. Leasehold Reform Act, ch. 88 (1967).
166. Viva Gas, I W.L.R. at 1449.
167. Id. at 1450-51.
168. Id. at 1451.
169. R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 234.
170. Id. at 235 n.58.
[Vol. 46:373
LAW AND LANGUAGE
Perhaps, because of this difficulty, expressio unius lends itself un-
commonly well to misuse and, consequently, has generated the most
hostile antipathy among some commentators. For example:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is in
direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons. To say that
all men are mortal does not mean that all women are not, or that all
other animals are not. There is no such implication, either in usage or in
logic, unless there is a very particular emphasis on the word men. It is
neither customary nor convenient to indicate such emphasis in statutes,
and without this indication, the first comment on the rule is that it is not
true. 171
In the face of this sort of hostility, some justification for the appeal of
the canon and the faith so many of us are tempted to place in it is
called for.
We all learned in introductory logic that from "Some swans are
white" one cannot deduce "Some swans are not white," although
most of us wanted to say one could. The reason was that if all swans
are white (and there are swans) then some swans are white. So where
"all swans are white" is true (and there are swans), "some swans are
white" is also true, but "some swans are not white" is false.
Why the temptation to make this invalid inference? Consider
these sentences in an actual conversation. The speaker knows of no
swans other than white ones; all his information points to there being
no such swans; why would he say, "some swans are white"? Surely
that would be infelicitous, a violation of Grice's maxims of quantity.
In those circumstances, he should have said as much as he could,
namely, "all swans are white." But since we assume felicity we can
thus deduce from the speaker's assertion, not the truth of "some
swans are not white," but that the speaker at least would hold that
some swans are not white. The pragmatic implicature comes not just
from the truth conditions of the words used but from the context of
their use and the social conventions governing conversation. 172
Radin's mistake with "all men are mortal" in the passage quoted
above is in divorcing it utterly from any context of actual use. Of
course, expressio unius will not apply in vacuo. Create a context, any
context, and some pragmatic implicature will appear.173
171. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (1930). See also R. DICK-
ERSON, supra note 3, at 234 ("Far from being a rule, it is not even lexicographically accurate
172. The example in Part IIA, 1, supra, of reporting an automobile accident is similar.
173. The obvious example is a domain of discourse of gods and man (generic) and doing things
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With legislative speech, the problems, though still plentiful, are
fewer than they are with ordinary conversation. 174 We can reasonably
expect a legislature always to speak felicitously and never to use liter-
ary devices for dramatic impact or social manipulation. Accordingly,
we can rely on its using words maximally (following Allwood's Postu-
late of Adequacy), always covering all but only the persons and ac-
tions it intends to (first and second maxims of quantity (statutes)) and,
within that limitation, always saying as much as, but not more than it
can (maxims of quantity), as clearly and concisely as it can (maxims
of manner); and all this only in demonstrable furtherance of its legis-
lative purpose (first maxim of quality (statutes)). Thus, we do not
have to handle the difficulties of trying to cope with a statement out of
context or with determining whether the speaker is being ironic, over
cautious, or just too cute. Legislative utterances are confined to their
topics (the maxim of relevance (statutes)) in respect to both domain
and purpose.
Given the requirements of felicitous legislative speech, the canon
expressio unius really amounts to little more than a restatement of
Grice's maxim of quantity, "say as much as you can," and the prag-
matic implicatures that flow from it. It will, however, always require
full use of the context, the intent of the provision, and the purpose of
the legislation.
Consider one of the U.C.C.'s rules creating warranties on the
transfer of a negotiable instrument (for example, a check):
3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration
warrants to his transferee ... that...
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered ....
Does this mean that if I sell a blunt instrument (hammer) to my
neighbor, I warrant the genuineness of the manufacturer's signature
on the handle and that I have not altered it?175 Of course not; the
provision is confined in scope to its domain of discourse, commercial
of great or indefinite duration. Then the pragmatic implicature, by expressio unius, is, at least,
"Some gods are immortal" and perhaps "All gods are immortal."
174. For this reason, critics, like Radin and Dickerson, who base their attack on the canon on
examples of its inapplicability to everyday speech are to that extent mistaken. See supra note 171.
175. This example seems trivial; but it is not very different in that respect from Radin's exam-
ple. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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paper 176 (the maxim of relevance (statutes) (scope)). Does it mean
that a woman who transfers a check for consideration does not make
such a warranty (expressio unius on the masculine pronoun)? Of
course not; the purpose of the statute is clearly to determine the rules
for use of negotiable instruments, and the intent of this section is
transfer warranties. Such an interpretation would be in defiance of
the maxim of relevance (statutes) (purpose). But it does mean that
one who transfers a check for no consideration, as, for example, in a
gift, does not make these warranties. The legislature, saying as much
as it could, placed the burden of these warranties on all and only the
persons it intended to (first and second maxims of quantity (statutes)).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
It should be noted that this does not follow as a matter of logic or
pure semantics. The quoted provision is equivalent in form to an "If
I .. , then. . ." statement, and we all learned, again in elementary
logic, that from the denial of the antecedent one cannot deduce the
denial of the consequent. "If I jump from the top of the Empire State
Building then I'll die" may be true, but not making such a jump is not
a guarantee of immortality. 177 On a simple, 17 8 truth-functional analy-
sis the consequent is undetermined when the antecedent is false. Ac-
cordingly, if the check is transferred by gift, the judge is free to decide
warranty burdens as he chooses. Only by using pragmatic constraints
can the necessary (and proper) implicature be generated. 179
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius thus appears as a derivative
of the conditions of felicitous legislative speech and, in particular,
those pertaining to quantity. Its application will always be sui
generis: its use requires treating the provision in question in its full
context and within the confines of legislative domain and purpose.
The above example is a very simple one; others are not so easy, and, in
176. Article 3 of the U.C.C. bears the caption "Commercial Paper," and captions are relevant.
U.C.C. § 1-109.
177. Nor even, to be more fair, of surviving any longer than I would if I went to New York and
jumped.
178. Logicians can give a much better answer using set theoretic semantics. See, e.g., D.
LEwis, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973); Stalnaker & Thomason, A Semantic Analysis of Conditional
Logic, 36 THEORIA 23 (1970).
179. An interesting by-product of legislative speech's being nontruth functional in the ordinary
way is that the usual pragmatic ambiguities do not always apply. Consider the proposition: "If
Cambridge were in Georgia, Harvard would be a southern college." This could be true or false
according as one shifted Cambridge or redrew the boundaries of Georgia to make the antecedent
true. Not so if it were a legislative utterance: even if you redrew Georgia, by legislative fiat Harvard
would still be a southern college.
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many cases, no clear answer will fall into place. That is scarcely sur-
prising. I shall try briefly to illustrate some of the difficulties with
another example from the U.C.C.
Suppose a state has adopted section 2-318 Alternative A, to gov-
ern the reach of article 2 warranties in nonprivity situations.180
2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied
A seller's warranty. . . extends to any natural person who is in the fam-
ily of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured by breach of warranty.
This is very precisely stated; if the legislature is saying as much as it
can, then persons outside the specified class do not get the benefit of
the seller's warranties. For example, the seller's (manufacturer's)
warranty would not run to the person (consumer) who buys from his
buyer (retailer). But was the legislature saying as much as it could?
That it chose alternative A and not one of the more open alternatives,
B or C, suggests it was. But, on the other hand, the drafters added
comment 3:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provi-
sions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to the
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
The comment suggests that, for all that the legislature may have said
as much as it wanted to for the moment, it did not want to intimate
that this is all that can or should be said. The courts are free to de-
velop a less restricted class of beneficiaries as they see fit. But the
comment is not a part of the statute or of its legislative history. Un-
less the status of the comment is determined, we simply cannot tell
whether expressio unius confines the class of beneficiaries or does not.
Different courts have decided the question in opposite ways.' 8 ' This
is an unusually clear example of the general question whether the leg-
islature in its statutory enactment is occupying the field to the preclu-
sion of common law development or not. That question can only be
180. The problem was suggested by Professor Dickerson. He lists five possible interpretations,
all plausible. R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 235.
181. Indiana, for example, does not allow the warranty to run to the second purchaser. See
Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. App. 1980). Pennsylvania is quite the opposite. See Kas-
sab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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'answered on independent grounds peculiar to each provision of each
statute.
From the foregoing, I hope it is clear that appropriate use of at
least some of the hoary old canons of construction can be justified on
speech act theory. 182 The justification does not establish the canons as
immutable universal rules; had it done so it would have been, ipso
facto, wrong. Rather, just as the theory's maxims of conversation ap-
ply more or less according to the actual contextual conditions that
obtain, 83 so too do the canons of construction.
In modem times, there has never been much doubt as to the goal
of statutory construction: "In the interpretation of statutes, the func-
tion of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as
to give effect to the intent of Congress."' 84 Legislatures act in a con-
text, for a purpose, and within the constraints imposed by the require-
ments of communication. The theory of pragmatics offered here takes
explicit account of these facts as justification for canons which cap-
tured, but only implicitly, many of the same consequences:
The so-called rules of interpretation are not rules that automatically
reach results, but ways of attuning the mind to a vision comparable to
that possessed by the legislature. The vision of itself rarely actually
grasps the particular determinate, but the eye once aligned in the same
direction will more probably place a particular determinate in its appro-
priate spot. 18 5
The same point was addressed centuries ago by Plowden' 86 and re-
cently in most elegant psychological terms by Professor Lehman. 187
Canons of construction thus are pragmatic tools useful only when the
grounds on which they rest also hold. As Landis says: "Like most
'rules of law,' they solve only the obvious case, and give direction for
profitable thinking about the difficult ones. And it is true of them, as
of most 'rules of law,' that occasions will arise when they must be
broken."'188 Making explicit the justification for these canons should
182. I hope further that the basic approach to justifying other canons has also become clear.
183. See supra text accompanying note 43.
184. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1939). See also Cox, supra
note 107, at 372-73; F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 11 (3d ed. 1880).
185. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 892 (1930).
186. Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 459, 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (1574). Plowden, the reporter, in-
cluded lengthy commentaries on some cases anticipating the use of his work as a law text. Id. at 465,
75 Eng. Rep. at 695.
187. Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489.
188. Landis, supra note 185, at 892-93.
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help discriminate the obvious from the difficult case and make clear
what sort of occasion requires their breach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Grice's work upon which this Article is based may be seen as
part of an ongoing program 189 of determining the conditions required
for an utterance to be meaningful. In most conversations, being
meaningful has a great deal to do with truth and falsity, concepts
which do not apply to legislation. This Article is an attempt to apply
the same style of thinking to legislation, notwithstanding this impor-
tant difference.
The result is a small set of pragmatic maxims that together spell
out part of what it is for a legislature to act felicitously. Each maxim
is justified as a reasonable requirement and as a condition for ration-
ally purposeful legislative action. All can be found in judicial opin-
ions in less explicit form.
The maxims are useful in statutory interpretation and in making
clear the content and justification of some concepts with which we are
already familiar. To use them we must assume legislative compliance,
that is, that the legislature did act felicitously, saying as much as it
could, as clearly as it could, to further its purposes as best it could.
Even if in a particular instance some maxim was not historically satis-
fied, this assumption is still warranted.
Pragmatics, as an approach to the use of language, focuses on the
actual use of words in the full context of their use. This discussion
has attempted to treat statutory enactments in the same way; that is,
as legislative speech acts occurring purposefully in fully developed
contexts. Meaning attaches to such performances, not to the abstract
linguistic tokens found in dictionaries.
189. See also Strawson, supra note 50; Strawson, On Referring, 59 MIND 320 (1950).
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